GLOBAL HEALTH & SECURITY





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
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NATIONAL SECURITY IS NOT JUST ABOUT **PROTECTION FROM STATE AND NONSTATE ACTORS, BUT ALSO ENCOMPASSES PROTECTION FROM EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES AND OTHER HEALTH OUTCOMES THAT CAN** Security THREATEN GLOBAL, REGIONAL Environment & NATIONAL ECONOMIC VITALITY AND ITS VERY WAY OF LIFE

DISEASES ARE UNAWARE OF
NATIONAL BOUNDRIES





What is Global Health Security?



"the activities required, both proactive and reactive, to minimize the danger and impact of acute public health events that endanger people's health across geographical regions and international boundaries." (WHO)

"statist vs. globalist perspective"

Principle foundations are :









Action Packages to Achieve Targets



Antimicrobial Resistance



Zoonotic Diseases



Biosafety/Biosecurity



مريك

National Laboratory Systems







Workforce Development



Emergency Operations Centers



Linking Public Health with Law Enforcement and Multisectoral Rapid Response



Medical Countermeasures and Personnel Deployment

Key Concepts and Definitions

INCIDENCE: new cases over a specified period of time (fraction or percentage)

PREVALENCE: number of disease cases in a population over a specified period of time (fraction, percentage, per 10,000, per 100,000)


MORTALITY RATE: measure of the number of deaths in a particular population per unit of time. (per 1000)

CASE FATALITY RATE: (# of deaths from a specified disease over defined period of time/ total number diagnosed with disease over defined period of time) X 100 (percentage)


MORBIDITY RATE: measure of illness

Ro ("naught"): the average number of people that one sick person goes on to infect in a group that has no immunity (measure of transmissibility, infectiousness)

RESERVOIR vs. VECTOR



Stakeholders to Global Health Security




CONFLICT, WAR, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISEASE

MILITARY

- Until World War II, more war victims died of microbes introduced by the enemy, than of battle wounds. <u>4 died of</u> <u>Infectious diseases for every 1 killed in combat.</u> (Karlen, 1995)
- More often than not, the victors in past wars were not those armies with the best weapons and generals, but those bearing the deadliest pathogens. <u>Spanish American war 85% of deaths</u> <u>due to Typhoid.</u> (Zinsser, 1943; Diamond, 1998).
- Malaria the Great Conqueror: 1. 28 year old British Serviceman stationed in Germany, called to the Falklands for 4 month. 2. 1945 Burma Front. Japanese were decimated by Malaria and the victory went to the British and Indian troops.

Economic Impacts of Infectious Diseases

Estimated Cost



Figures are estimates and are presented as relative size. Based upon bio-era, World Bank, and UNDP data. Chart updated by EcoHealth Alliance.

Countries with strong Public Health and Primary Care Systems fare better HEALTH SYSTEM based on EMERGENCY PRIMARY HEALTH CARE Universal coverage/equity Community participation Intersectoral collaboration Preparedness Appropriate technology 1. Strengthening health systems 2. Community Response based disaster PRIMARY/COMMUNITY Disaster risk LEVEL CARE management management and planning Coping 3. Benchmarkingmechanisms CBHW community SECONDARY Self-care based and TERTIARY LEVEL CARE benchmarks HOSPITAL

Mawardi, F., Lestari, A., Randita, A., Kambey, D., & Prijambada, I. (2021). Strengthening Primary Health Care: Emergency and Disaster Preparedness in Community with Multidisciplinary Approach. *Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness, 15*(6), 675-676. doi:10.1017/dmp.2020.143

2 Case Scenarios



Gardening Phenomena (1999)

Two males are admitted to the same hospital (ages 60. 75) with sudden paralysis, disorientation, fevers. Assumed to have and treated for a bacterial/viral meningitis, but not responding. 8 other patients present to other hospitals with similar symptoms. Samples sent to CDC and initially felt to be St. Louis encephalitis, but CDC revised the diagnosis, 6 weeks after the initial cases. All the patients enjoyed gardening in the evenings. As of 2018, now reported in every state.

Super spreaders Doctor Shopping (2012)

Saudi Arabia, first case with a pneumonia infecting 8 health care workers. 1783 cases with 726 deaths. flu like symptoms. 30% mortality. Korean Businessman travels to Saudi Arabia. 5 days later seen in Korean clinic with flu like symptoms of fever, muscle aches and nonproductive cough. All 186 patients exposed at different hospitals. Affected health care workers. 17000 people quarantined for 14 days, cost \$ 8.5 billion.2015 Outbreak in Korea with 186 people sick and 38 deaths.

What, Who, Where, When, Why (5 W's to disease process)




- What : Transmission (airborne, contact, fecal-oral, vector), Organism (Bacteria, Viral, Parasite, Chemical, Toxin)
- Who: group or population affected (children, adults, elderly, co-morbid medical conditions, gender)
- Where: location, rural vs. urban
- When: temporal relationship (seasonal)
- Why: can only be answered once the other questions have been answered

What did these Epidemic Infectious Diseases have in common?




>ALL WERE CAUSED BY ZOONOTIC PATHOGENS > ALL SPREAD BY MODERN TRANSPORTATION >MOST HAD ASIAN ORIGIN >LABORATORY AND CLINICAL DIAGNOSES WERE PROBLEMATIC > POOR COMMUNICATION AMONG COUNTRIES >MAJOR ECONOMIC IMPACT



Urban Crucible: Impacts of urbanization on chronic and infectious diseases






Turkey Iraq


ussia

China

India

Current Global Threats





Firs Cas Detection Reporting Response Potential cases Lab prevented 90 Confirm 80 ation 70 60 CASES 50 40 30 20 10 10 13 19 22 28 31 37 40 DAY

Impact of delayed reporting of infectious diseases by clinicians on disease outbreak control and prevention

Impact of early reporting of infectious diseases by clinicians on disease outbreak control and prevention

doi: 10.4103/0300-1652.160347

Conflict, Refugees, Internally Displaced People, Host Countries, Health

The World at War in 2022

Countries in which armed clashes between state forces and/or rebels were reported in 2022*



* As of Feb 4 Source: The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project







U.S. National Security Strategy of 2002 recognizes Infectious Diseases as a potential danger to the Nations Security



NO UNIVERSAL HEALTH CARE COVERAGE/ 50 STATES EACH WITH THEIR OWN ABILITY TO DETERMINE HEALTH CARE POLICIES/ WHY?

Question? NAME EITHER THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED OR 3 LARGEST ANNUAL RELIGIOUS PILGRIMAGES




60-75% emerging infectious diseases have a zoonotic origin



Toonotic Diseaso

Antibiotic Resistance






HOW PATHOGENS CAN ELLUDE THE IMMUNE SYSTEM?




- ANTIGENIC VARIATION: CHANGE SURFACE PROTEINS, COAT, OR ALTER THE DNA (INFLUENZA, STREPTOCOCCUS, TRYPANASOMES, MALARIA, GONORRHEA)
 LATENCY (DORMANT): HERPES VIRUS
- PREVENTS MACROPHAGES FROM RELEASING COMPOUNDS TO KILL BACTERIA (TB,LISTERIA, TOXOPLASMA)
- AVOID REOGNITION OF ANTIBODIES BY COATING ITSELF WITH HOST MOLECULES (LYMES, SYPHILIS)
- KIDNAPPING AND PIRACY: SYNTHESIZING COMPLEMENT REGULATORY MOLECULES, INHIBITING MHA SYNRHESIS OR ASSEMBLY, PRODUCING DECOY PROTEINS



Survival is the ability to adapt



How antibiotic resistance spread









Survival is the ability to adapt







Counterfeit Drugs, by Category

Cardiovascular	11.6%
Central Nervous System	11%
Alimentary	9.1%
Musculoskeletal	8.1%
Metabolism	7.7%
Respiratory	3.8%

1 NEW REPUBLIC



SUBSTANDARD MEDS

P

Counterfeit Drugs : weak risks/ big profits

For 1.000 \$ invested, profits can reach:



50%

Up to

of cases, medicines' purchased over the internet from illegal sites that conceal their physical address have found to be counterfeit

27.5 MILLION"

counterfeit medicines retained by European Customs Authorities 36%⁽⁶⁾ of anti-malaria drugs in Southeast Asia are falsified

doses of illicit medicine seized in Africa during the "Biyela" operation

550 MILLION

10%⁽¹⁾ of the world's medicines are counterfeit

9.8 MILLION


illegal and counterfeit drugs seized during «Pangea VI» operation

Field Tests and Scanners



The Global Pharma Health Fund (GPHF) Minilab Test Kit


Rahrnan's spectroscopy




ONE HEALTH

Social







Lessons Learned: 3 years into this pandemic



Where Did We Go Wrong with This Pandemic?

Gernon, L.W. (2022) Where Did We Go Wrong with This Pandemic?. Open Journal of Emergency Medicine, 10, *-*. https://doi.org/10.4236/***.2022.****

Lessons Learned: Health care and Public Health Funding



Lack of funding towards pandemic preparedness, health care infrastructure, recruitment and training for health care workers and public health



Lessons Learned: Role of WHO



Understanding the role of WHO/WHA, successes failures, expectations



Lessons learned: Data reporting/ Accuracy?




Figure 6. US deaths (Source: https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/vsrr/COVID19/excess_deaths.htm).

Lessons Learned: Vaccines & Vaccine Equity




Vaccine Nationalism, Shortages, Propietary Rights

statista 🔽


Where Coronavirus Vaccines Will Be Produced

Estimated coronavirus vaccine production capabilities in 2020 and 2021 by country (in billion doses)



Covid-19 Vaccine Doses Secured By Governments


Total number of Covid-19 vaccine doses secured as of November 20, 2020



Source: Duke University Launch and Scale Speedometer

 (\bigcirc)

Rich countries will get access to coronavirus vaccines earlier than others



Source: Airfinity via DW



Lessons learned: Communications & Public Information



effective communication during a public health crisis is not merely about messaging. Instead, it is an interactive process of exchange of information and opinion among individuals, groups, and institutions.


trust is widely recognised as being a central pillar of effective public health crisis management. establishment of trust requires transparency and civic engagement.

TRUST, TRANSPARENCY, EMPATHY and UNCERTAINTY IS INEVITABLE


Lessons learned: Immunology & Laboratory

Understanding the Immunology and Laboratory parameters of Covid Infection


SARS-COV-2 VIRAL LOAD AND PERIOD OF INFECTIOUSNESS



Source: Cevik M et al; https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.07.25.20162107



Lessons learned: Global supply chains



Lessons learned: National Responses



The Best and Worst Rated National COVID-19 Responses

Countries with best/worst net approval rating for government handling of COVID-19 (2 June)




Approval ratings calculated by subtracting 'handling badly' from 'handling well' response shares. Sources: YouGov, Our World in Data





Lessons learned: Chronic Diseases vs. Communicable Diseases



Communicable, maternal, perinatal and nutritional conditions Non-communicable diseases Injuries

Top 10 causes of death in Islamic Republic of Iran (2019)



In preparation for the next epidemic/pandemic:

Should Nations and Regions develop collaborative research facilities for sharing health data, surveillance, laboratory capabilities and vaccine production and how do we engage in this process?



What is the mechanism for reporting possible communicable or novel infections?

Is digital surveillance and telemedicine an acceptable means of contact tracing and disease surveillance?

How prepared is your locality for natural disasters?

How do we engage Government in providing continuous resources, training, funding to health care/public health and emergencies?

Should Governments develop a Strategic National Stockpile given the shortages we have seen in the Global supply chain?



